Coalitional Game Based Transactive Energy Management in Local Energy Communities

This paper has focused on transactive energy management in local energy communities and proposes a coalitional game model which considers the presence and utilization of flexible loads and the uncertainties in renewable energy sources. The superadditivi-ty and balancedness of the proposed game model have been proved rigorously by demonstrating that a nucleolus-based solu-tion leads to a stable and fair payoff distribution scheme for all players.

More specifically, the objective function has been proved concave with its analytical expression, derived through an ap-proximated piecewise linear function. The proposed allocation of realized payoffs has then been proved to converge consistently to a nucleolus-based solution. Through numerical analyses, it has been demonstrated that the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff and the proposed allocation scheme contributes to peak shaving and valley filling in the network's profile.