Conference paper
Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols
In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible.
There are a few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover.
The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model.
Language: | English |
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Publisher: | IEEE |
Year: | 2021 |
Pages: | 1-16 |
Proceedings: | 2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium |
ISBN: | 1728176077 , 1728176085 , 9781728176079 and 9781728176086 |
ISSN: | 23748303 and 19401434 |
Types: | Conference paper |
DOI: | 10.1109/CSF51468.2021.00006 |
ORCIDs: | Hess, Andreas Viktor and Mödersheim, Sebastian Alexander |