Conference paper
Exploring market properties of policy-based reserve procurement for power systems
Energy Analytics and Markets, Center for Electric Power and Energy, Centers, Technical University of Denmark1
Center for Electric Power and Energy, Centers, Technical University of Denmark2
Department of Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark3
Flemish Institute for Technological Research4
This paper proposes a market mechanism for co-optimization of energy and reserve procurement in dayahead electricity markets with high shares of renewable energy. The single-stage chance-constrained day-ahead market clearing problem takes uncertain wind in-feed into account, resulting in optimal day-ahead dispatch schedule and an affine participation policy for generators for the real-time reserve provision.
Under certain assumptions, the chance-constrained market clearing is reformulated as a quadratic program. Using tools from equilibrium modeling and variational inequalities, we explore the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Under the assumption of perfect competition in the market, we evaluate the satisfaction of desirable market properties, namely cost recovery, revenue adequacy, market efficiency, and incentive compatibility.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed market clearing, it is benchmarked against a deterministic cooptimization of energy and reserve procurement. Biased and unbiased out-of-sample simulation results for a power systems test case highlight that the proposed market clearing results in lower expected system operations cost than the deterministic benchmark, without the loss of any desirable market properties.
| Language: | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | IEEE |
| Year: | 2020 |
| Pages: | 7498-7505 |
| Proceedings: | 58th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control |
| ISBN: | 1728113970 , 1728113989 , 1728113997 , 9781728113975 , 9781728113982 and 9781728113999 |
| ISSN: | 07431546 and 25762370 |
| Types: | Conference paper |
| DOI: | 10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9029777 |
| ORCIDs: | Ratha, Anubhav , Kazempour, Jalal and Pinson, Pierre |
Generators Nash equilibrium Power systems Procurement Production Real-time systems Uncertainty Wind forecasting affine participation policy convex programming convex quadratic program cost recovery day-ahead electricity markets deterministic co-optimization energy procurement equilibrium modeling game theory incentive compatibility incentive schemes market efficiency optimal day-ahead dispatch schedule policy-based reserve procurement power generation dispatch power generation economics power generation scheduling power markets power systems procurement quadratic programming renewable energy shares renewable energy sources revenue adequacy single-stage chance-constrained day-ahead market clearing problem variational inequalities
